Theoretical game model struggle of parties for electorate

Authors

  • N. I. Nedashkivskya
  • V. V. Ostapenko
  • O. S. Ostapenko

Abstract

А model to be used by parties during election campaign to define finances distribution among the regions to get a maximal advantage is proposed. Conditions under which the model can be referred to a convex game are defined. The conclusions resulted from the research proved true during the parliament elections in 2002.

Author Biographies

N. I. Nedashkivskya

Nedashkivskya N.I.

V. V. Ostapenko

Ostapenko V.V.

O. S. Ostapenko

Ostapenko O.S.

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Issue

No. 4 (2003)

Section

Methods of optimization, optimum control and theory of games

License

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