On a static model of voting prognosis

Authors

  • E. N. Belyaeva
  • V. M. Panin

Abstract

A simplified model of finances distribution among regions by some competing pre-election unions in the fight for the maximal number of votes is formulated. The model is reduced to the search of the equilibrium point by Nash. To determine the point a numerical method solving for monotone variational inequalities with a degenerate operator is used.

Author Biographies

E. N. Belyaeva

Belyaeva E.N.

V. M. Panin

Panin V.M.

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Issue

No. 3 (2003)

Section

Methods of optimization, optimum control and theory of games

License

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